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meet this definition. To do this the example of the British House of Lords, a hallmark example of weak
upper chambers, is used as a case study.
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House of Lords: Relevant or Relic?
An Analysis of the Political Relevance of Legislature Upper Houses
Robert Connor
although upper houses are not as powerful
as lower houses, they are nonetheless
relevant in the political system.
There has been much debate on the
relevance of upper houses of parliaments in
the modern age. While some argue that
upper houses are relics of a bygone age,
others argue that in many upper houses,
while being less powerful than lower
houses; still have a role to play in today’s
political environment. In this section, the
current role of upper houses will be
examined. An examination of one specific
example, the British Houses of Lords, the
hallmark of “weak” upper houses will then
be done.
In contemporary politics the upper
house have become almost relics in many
political systems. With the exception of the
United States, in all bicameral parliaments
the lower house holds the majority of the
political power. (In the United States the
upper house, the Senate, is superior to the
lower house, the House of Representatives,
in both precedent and in actual legislative
power.) (Fish and Kroenig, 2009) For the
purposes of this paper, the United States
Senate will be ignored as the exception to
the rule that upper houses are weaker than
lower houses in bicameral legislatures. What
has become an important issue for debate
among the political science community is if
the upper house is still a relevant body.
Sir Ivor Jennings argues that upper
houses are really only politically relevant in
federal systems, such as the United States.
Nevertheless, those in unitary systems they
can become redundant and unnecessary.
(Jennings 1958) De Minon agrees with this
point, but goes further to argue that even in
federal systems the usefulness of bicameral

The House of Lords has been a
legislative institution in Great Britain for
over seven-hundred years. However, in
modern politics the British people view the
Lords as a relic of a bygone aristocratic age
where those of “high birth” ruled over the
common people. For the past few decades,
there has been a heated debate in the United
Kingdom over the future of the Lords. Past
reforms have included removing hereditary
peers, strictly limiting the Lords’ power, and
changing the method of choosing members
of the House. For this reason, it is fair to ask
if the House of Lords is still politically
relevant in British politics today. However,
this question can, and should, extend to
encompass all parliamentary upper houses.
This is because of the trend for bicameral
legislatures to concentrate power in the
lower chamber, the people’s chamber, as
opposed to the upper house, which is
considered as the more prestigious but less
powerful house. This paper sets out to
accomplish three goals: the first is to
compile an all-encompassing definition of
political relevance, something that the
political scientist community has not
addressed before; second, to develop a
method of determining political relevance;
and third to examine whether or not
parliamentary upper houses are still
politically relevant using this method. To do
so this paper will examine the weakest of the
weak upper houses the British House of
Lords. The purpose of this is to show that if
even the House of Lords, the hallmark
example of the weak upper house is still
politically relevant, and then it can inferred
that all the other upper houses in modern
democracies are also politically relevant.
Once complete this paper will show that
12
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House of Lords is the main example of a
“weak” upper house. In fact, many disregard
the house completely and argue that it has
no relevance in modern Britain. This was the
case as early 1929. In that year, Eugene
Parker Chase argued that the people would
never consider the Lords legitimate while its
members are selected “by providence and
not merit”. (Chase 1929, 572) This was
especially true before the passage of the Life
Peerage Act of 1958. The Life Peerage Act
addressed one of the most controversial
elements of the House of Lords. Its members
inherited their seats by creating a system
where peers are appointed only for their life
and their children could not inherit their
title. The new law only allows these "Life
Peers" to sit in the House of Lords. The
Prime Minister appoints these peers, while
the monarch confirms the selection. More
recently, Russell and Cornes argue that
because the House of Lords have no
component that is elected, either directly or
indirectly, then the House is illegitimate. In
order to create legitimacy, they argue, the
people of Britain must have some voice in
who is allowed to sit in the House. (Russell
and Cornes 2001, 89) Peter Dorey goes
further to argue that unless the entirety of
the House of Lords is democratically elected
then the House is illegitimate. (Dorey 2006,
15)
Others argue that the Lords are
irrelevant because they have very little
authority. What no one will argue is that the
House of Lords has no independent
authority of the House of Commons. Prior to
2009, the House of Lords functioned as the
highest court in the Britain, but that power
was revoked when the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom was formed. The powers it
does have are meant to check the power of
the House of Commons: the ability to delay
any legislation (except for money bills) for a
maximum of one year; the power to
introduce legislation; the ability to adopt

legislatures is quickly disappearing. This is
due to the current trend of federalist states to
become more centralized. Moreover,
because of this centralization the upper
houses are not as necessary. De Minon
points to Germany as a prime example of a
federal state with a centralized government
and weak upper house. De Minon argues
that this uselessness of upper houses leaves
them irrelevant (De Minon, 1975)
Money and Tsebelis address this
issue of bicameralism in federal and unitary
systems. They argue that the primary
difference is that in federal system, there is a
balance of power between the two houses,
but in unitary systems, an upper house can
become redundant because it does not have
a clear constituency. In addition, in unitary
systems the primary role of the upper house
is to provide a “learned” body who can act
as the protectors of that state’s constitution.
(Money and Tsebelis 1992) In other terms,
Money and Tsebelis argue that the upper
houses in both systems are not “useless”, to
use de Minon’s word, but that they are, on
the surface at least, provided
responsibilities. (Money and Tsebelis 1992)
Druckman, Martin, and Thies also
disagree with de Minon. They argue that
even if the upper house is useless and weak
that does not automatically transition into
irrelevance. They argue that even the
weakest upper houses still have some
influence in their political systems. This is
because one power that is consistent
throughout upper houses is the power either
to veto legislation, or delay legislation.
Though many countries have put restrictions
on when their upper houses can do this, it
nevertheless gives them political capital.
Whether this influence translates into
outright power is debatable but not,
according to the authors, the influence itself.
(Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005)
It is time to turn attention to the
House of Lords in particular. Most view the
13
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politically irrelevant, but there are scholars
who argue that the Lords do retain some
relevancy. In terms of the makeup of the
Lords, Alexandra Kelso agrees with Russell
and Cornes Kelso that there must be a
democratic element to the selection of
Lords, but argues that the Life Peerage Act
does create an indirect election for the
Lords, since they are de facto chosen by the
democratically elected Prime Minister. This,
Kelso argues, does give the Lords
legitimacy. The major oversight Kelso,
Russel, and Scaria make is that none of them
address if the British people themselves
view the House as legitimate.(Kelso 2006,
14) This is a crucial point because, not only
does an institution need legitimacy legally,
but it needs to appear to be legitimate as
well.
Russell and Sciara address the issue
of how powerful the Lords are as a
legislative body. They argue that the Lords
have gained more power by using defeats, or
striking down legislation sent up to them by
the Commons. The authors examined all of
the cases in which the Lords defeated a bill
in chamber and the reactions of the
Commons. In all of these cases, the
Commons worked with the Lords to reach
an agreement to get the legislation passed
rather than overruling them. They divided
these compromises into three categories: a
win for the Commons, meaning they got
most of what they wanted at the expense of
the Lords; a draw, both Houses got
something they wanted; and a win for the
Lords. The results showed that between
1996 and 2006 when the Lords won 40.1%
of the time. (Russell and Scalia 2008, 5)
What this mean in terms of the authority of
the House of Lords is that even though they
may not have the power to translate their
positions on issues into policy, they do have
some power in the legislative process, if
they did not this number would be much
lower.

amendments to legislation sent up from the
House of Commons; and the power to adopt
or defeat legislation from the Commons.
The Lords possess these de jure powers,
meaning that these are the Lords’ powers
according to the written law. What is in
doubt is how these de jure powers translate
into de facto powers, meaning the powers
the Lords have in practice, (In practical
terms these powers are often different) or if
they transition at all. Chase argues that even
though the Lords may have these powers on
paper, the Commons can easily overturn the
will of the Lords. (Chase 1929, 573)
Patterson and Mughan point out that,
compared to other European bicameral
parliaments, it is much easier in the British
system for the lower house to overrule the
upper. (Patterson and Mughan 2001) This
highlights the uneven balance of powers
within the British parliament.
Another strong argument made in
defense of the Lords is that since the
Commons appoints the Lords, the Commons
control the decisions of the Lords. Dorey
makes this assertion saying that it is
impossible to forget that the Prime Minister
and his government from the Commons now
appoint the Lords, and that because the
Commons control membership to the Lords
they are not to be considered autonomous.
(Dorey 2006, 20) Nevertheless, this
argument is rather unconvincing; first, he
fails to realize that once the Commons have
appointed a Lord, that Lord is there for life;
this means that once the Lords are appointed
they can do what they like, within the
confines of the Lords’ Constitutional
responsibilities, without having to worry
about retaliation from the Commons. In this
sense, the Lords are comparable to Justices
on the United States Supreme Court. Once
appointed it is difficult to influence voting
behavior.
The previous arguments are the main
arguments that deal with the Lords being
14
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meaning does a body have influence, in this
case influence on policy and legislation.
However, it is necessary for an institution,
specifically a legislative institution, to have
more than influence in order to be relevant.
In order to be considered politically relevant
a legislative institution must possess, or
must appear to possess legitimacy, authority,
and autonomy in addition to influence on
legislation is this order of importance.
Perhaps the most important factor of
political relevance is legitimacy, or by what,
if any, right the institution has claim to
power. Legitimacy can come in many forms;
the most common form today is in the form
of democratic legitimacy: the right to rule
based on democratic elections. However,
this right can be in other forms: legal
legitimacy codified in laws and statues;
control of the military can lead to dictatorial
legitimacy; even divine right, or the idea of
“God’s chosen ruler” is a form of political
legitimacy. Legitimacy is vital for a political
institution because if a populace does not
view that body as being legitimate it has no
incentive to follow those institutions orders.
This is why I include dictatorial legitimacy,
or right by might, because even though they
may not be traditionally legitimate a
dictator’s control over the military gives him
a strong claim on power. (Hetherington,
1998)
The second most important factor of
political relevance is authority. Now, many
would intuitively think this would be the
most important factor in political relevance,
but remember that if a body is not viewed as
legitimate it does not have a claim on power.
This why Legitimacy must be established
first. What authority means is what the
institution can actually do; another term for
this might be de facto powers. (Reed, 2001)
Does the body have the authority to levy
taxes, to declare war, to regulate trade, to
print money, to approve treaties, to submit a
budget, even to declare a national holiday

Russell and Sciara also examine how
much power the Commons have over the
Lords. They argue that the Lords are by no
means a puppet of the Commons. They
argue that this can clearly be seen in its
regular use of defeats and delays. (Russell
and Sciara 2008, 3) Kelso agrees with this
point, but further argues that the tension
between the Labour Party and the Lords
during the 1990s is another indication of the
Lords’ autonomy. If the Commons
controlled the Lords, this tension would not
exist. (Kelso 2006, 10) Even to Chase
writing in the 1920s before the Peerage Act
of 1958, the fact that the freely elected
Commons did not have complete control
over the, then, hereditary Lords was his
greatest criticism of the House. (Chase 1929,
577) This is not to argue that these authors
believe the Lords to be completely
autonomous, but to argue that they are not
merely a rubberstamp for the Commons.
The Lords have control over their decisions
and that these decisions are not dictated by
the Commons. However, not everyone
agrees that the Lords have at least some
autonomy from the Commons.
Although academics in the past have
attempted to answer several question
regarding the legitimacy, authority,
autonomy, and level of influence in the
House of Lords, each has addressed these
factors individually and not as a whole.
None has taken the next step and examines
these four factors together and their
relationships to one another in order to
understand fully the true political relevance
of the Lords. Are they still relevant in the
United Kingdom of today, or are they a relic
of a bygone age. The exact question this
paper addresses.
The most important question to ask
of any institution is “is it politically
relevant?” Webster dictionary defines
relevant as having significant and
demonstrable bearing on the matter at hand;
15
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mentioned above, which may not be
completely autonomous but are still relevant
to that political system. This is because
those bodies still have some influence over
the institutions that hold dominance over
them, such as blocks on legislation, limited
veto power, etc. This is the definitive
difference between a body that is merely
subservient, meaning they may not be
autonomous but still have influence and
body that is a only a rubberstamp, a body
with neither autonomy nor influence. For
example, in many European systems, the
lower house of parliament carries
dominance over the upper house, but in most
instances, the upper house retains some
influence over legislation.
So far, it has been established that in
order for a legislative institution to be
considered politically relevant it must have
legitimacy and at least some independent
authority, and either be autonomous or have
influence on policy, or both. Therefore, it is
necessary to determine if the House of Lords
meet these qualifications. However, the
more difficult task is how to quantify these
separate factors and determine if the House
of Lords possess them.
In order to determine if the House of
Lords are legitimate it is necessary to first
examine how that body was created. Was it
codified in legislation, was it created by an
individual, and was it established through
the tenants of some religion? This will
determine which type of legitimacy the
Lords are basing themself off. However, this
is not enough. In order to determine
legitimacy it must be determined whether
the population believes that the House is
legitimate. Perception is the key here,
because if the House is not viewed as
legitimate then it is not legitimate, no matter
how it was created or by what means it
claims the power to legislate. In order to do
this polling data will be collected in regards
to how the people of Great Britain view the

are all important questions because they
demonstrate how much power that
institution has. I am making a distinction
here between de jure and de facto powers,
because this is more helpful to this
discussion. This is due to the realization that
all legislative bodies will attempt to
maximize their authority to the fullest extent
allowable under the law. Even an
institutions ability to create this
maximization is a reflection of their
authority.
The third factor for relevance is
autonomy, whether or not the legislative
body is governing, or is being governed. As
with authority, autonomy builds upon the
previous factors, and that the previous
factors, legitimacy and authority, are
necessary in order for a legislative body to
be autonomous. The point is to examine
whether the institution has control over itself
and its decisions, or is merely a rubber
stamp. Nevertheless, an institution can be
legitimate and have some authority while
not being autonomous. If that institution is a
puppet, or if its decisions are dictated to it
by another branch of government, or even
another house of the same legislature, then
that body is not truly autonomous. The
parliament is usually dominated by the
lower house with the upper having few if
any means to assert what authority is has;
this is an issue that many upper houses in
parliamentary systems face. An example of
this is would the institution be more
analogous to the United States Congress,
which is independent of the other two
branches of government, the Executive and
Judiciary, or to the Senate of the ancient
Roman Empire which was controlled by the
Executive branch.
The last factor is influence. This is
the concept of whether or not an institution
can change legislation in other parts of
government to receive its preferred policies.
This factor addresses those institutions
16
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of Lords, the weakest of all upper houses,
has some political relevance it will show
that the other upper houses should still be
politically relevant.
As stated above in order to establish
legitimacy two factors will be looked at:
what give the House legitimacy, and
whether the public perceive the body to be
legitimate. The foundations of the House of
Lords lie in the Magna Carta of 1215, which
created a council of twenty noblemen who
had the authority to overrule the reigning
monarch if his decrees violated their rights.
From the period of the thirteenth century to
the mid-nineteenth century, the House of
Lords reigned as the premier House in the
Parliament. It was only after the English
Civil War and the subsequent Glorious
Revolution that the Commons began to gain
more power in the Parliament. (Miller 1962)
However, the Commons would not become
the dominant chamber until the reforms of
the mid nineteenth century. In addition,
though there is no British Constitution, the
body of laws and statutes that have been
taken to form the unwritten constitution
clearly provides for the House of Lords.
(Round 1915) What this is taken to mean is
that the House of Lords can clearly claim to
be legitimate based on the principle of legal
legitimacy, the definition of which plainly
mean legitimacy based on laws and statutes.
However, this only answers half the
question of whether the House of Lords is
legitimate or not. The more important
question is whether the House of Lords is
perceived as legitimate by the British
people. While it is clear that the House is
legally legitimate, this question is more
difficult to answer. To answer this recent
polling data and how it relates to the Lords
will be examined. The following tables all
represent polls taken by Ipsos MORI, the
world’s largest research company, showing
public opinion in the United Kingdom
regarding the House of Lords.

House of Lords. The way in which it will
establish that the House of Lords has
independent authority is by examining what
the House can and cannot do. These powers
will then are examined and determine if
these powers give the Lords any real
authority. Autonomy will be determined by
examining what checks the Commons have
on the Lords, and how the Lords are chosen.
These factors will show if the Lords are
autonomous or if the Commons is
controlling them. Lastly, the House’s level
of influence will be investigated by
examining how effective the Lords are at
getting their positions passed in legislation.
To do this the rate at which the Commons
approves bills introduced in the Lords will
be viewed. This rate will show how
influential the Lords views are in the House
of Commons. By the use of these
measurements, one can develop a valid
means to quantify the political relevance of
the House of Lords.
Since this study will rely heavily on
qualitative data, with some quantitative data,
the reliability of the sources used will be
paramount. All qualitative sources will have
been peer reviewed and all quantitative
sources, including polls, will come from
only the most trusted British organizations.
The reason one can examine the
House of Lords in order to assess the
relevance of upper houses in bicameral
legislatures is methodological in nature. As
stated before the House of Lords is the
hallmark example of the weak upper house,
it is perceived as outdated, irrelevant, and
unnecessary, which is common with most
other upper houses. Nonetheless, because of
the nature of its composition the reputation
of the House of Lords suffers from these
blemishes to a much greater degree than its
elected counterparts. For this reason, the
House of Lords can be incredibly useful in
assessing the relevancy of all upper houses.
Because, if it can show that even the House
17
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believe the House is a clear danger to British
politics and must be reformed immediately,
a mere seven percent. What is clear is that
the overwhelming majority, 72%, believe
that the House of Lords is in need of reform,
but think that other issues are more
important at the moment. This implies that
the majority of the population does not see
the Lords as a direct threat to their liberty. If
the majority of people believed the House to
be illegitimate, the number of people who
believe that reform of the Lords is a top
priority would be much higher.

*See table 1
The data in table 1 shows that
between the years of 1999 and 2006 there
was a marked increase in how the public
viewed the legitimacy of the House of
Lords. Among all of the British voters,
forty-three percent believe that the Lords are
now more legitimate than they were in the
1990s. It worth noting that conservative
voters did not have an increase at the same
level as the liberal voters. One explanation
for this discrepancy is that during the time
this poll was taken the liberals had a
majority in the Lords. This rise in perception
of legitimacy can be due to many factors,
but is most likely due to the House of Lords
Reform bill of 2005, which created an
independent Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom, a power that was previously held
by the Lords. It may seem counterintuitive
to think that a loss of power would result in
a heightened sense of legitimacy, but this
specific power given to the Lords was
extremely unpopular the people of Britain
who preferred an independent judiciary. So
even though this law may have taken away
power from the Lords, that power was
replaced by popularity. This poll provides
the best evidence that the Britons view the
Lords as legitimate, but in order to be more
thorough two other pools will be considered.

*See table 3
In table 3 it can be seen that the
British people as a whole, believe that when
it comes to how well each House carries out
its role, the House of Lords does a better job
than the House of Commons. This again
reinforces the fact that the British people see
the Lords as legitimate. Although the poll
does not use the word legitimate, the fact
that the majority of people believe that the
Lords are fulfilling their duties, and that they
are in fact doing a better job than the
Commons, show that they appear legitimate.
As mentioned before, legitimacy is
the most important factor when it comes to
political relevance. It has been shown that
the existence of the House of Lords is
strongly rooted in British law, and, with
these three tables, the people of Britain
understand the House to be legitimate. With
this accomplished it is now prudent to turn
our attention to the authority of the House of
Lords.
In order to determine if the Lords
have any de facto authority this paper will
determine what legislative powers the body
possesses. According to the website of the
United Kingdom Parliament, the House of
Lords have only three real powers: the
power to introduce legislation, the power to
delay legislation for up to one year, and the

*See table 2
Although this exact question does
not address legitimacy as directly as the
previous table, one can make several
inferences regarding how the people of
Great Britain view the House of Lords. First,
about one-sixth of the population believes
that the House of Lords is in no need of
reform, that the House is legitimate and
functioning adequately. While a clear
minority, it is more common than those that
18
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domestic policies, but as has already seen it
is in these areas that the Lords are at their
most powerful anyway.
The last main power of the Lords is
the power to amend or defeat legislation
passed up from the Commons. The Lords
frequently take advantage of these powers.
(Russell and Cornes 2001) Rather than
introducing their own bills to address topics
outside of their ordinary sphere of influence,
mainly minor domestic issues, they amend
bills from the Commons to reflect their
policies. However, if the Commons do not
accept the Lords’ amendments, the Lords do
have the ability to defeat the bill by not
passing the bill. This does not stop the bill
from being passed, as the Commons can
overrule the Lords; but it does complicate
matters for the Commons. In recent years,
the Lords have been using this power of
defeats to greater and greater effect. Table 4
shows how in 2003 the Lords used defeats to
get their policies through the Commons.

power to amend or defeat legislation
originating in the
Commons.(www.parliament .uk, 2012)
Nonetheless do these de jure powers
translate into de facto power? First, it is
necessary to examine the power to introduce
legislation. The Lords can independently
draft legislation and introduce it into the
Parliament. In fact, In 2012, of the one
hundred and twenty bills put before the
parliament, thirty-six originated in the
House of Lords, which calculates to about
thirty percent of the bills.
(www.parliament.uk, 2012) It is worth
mentioning however, that the Lords most
commonly introduce bills related to minor
domestic matters. The Lords almost never
introduce bills associated with social,
political, or foreign issues; these matters are
left to the Commons. Therefore, even
though the Lords do have the power to
introduce legislation on any topic, in
practice they limit themselves to a relatively
small sphere of influence.
The next primary power of the Lords
is the power to delay legislation. The Lords
are authorized to delay legislation sent up
from the Commons for up to one year, but
this ability is not as powerful as it may
seem. First of all the Lords cannot delay so
called money bills, bills designed to raise
money through taxes or spend public
money. (www.parliament.uk , 2012) The
definition is loose and can encompass many
different types of legislation. The only
individual who decides what is a money bill
is the Speaker of the House of Commons,
and this decision is final, once a Speaker has
designated a bill, as a money bill there is no
means to appeal this decision. In addition,
since the Speaker has a habit of labeling any
major piece of legislation money bill the
Lords are de facto locked out of the major
legislation, and cannot employ their primary
means of checking the Commons. This
relegates the use of delays to mainly minor,

*See table 4
What is meant by a win for the Lords
is that the policies of the Lords are
expressed to a greater degree than those of
the Commons. The fact that the results
showing the Lords wining over forty percent
of the time is surprising, especially given the
weak perception of the Lords, one would
expect this number to be much lower. The
reason for this result is that the process for
overruling the Lords is usually slower and
more arduous than compromising with them
(this is to be discussed further in the section
on autonomy). It is clear that the Lords’ use
of amendments and defeats have given them
some degree of political power, even though
they de facto have a limitation on their
power to introduce legislation and their
delaying power is so strictly controlled.
While clearly not the major power holder,
they nonetheless are not powerless
19
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must examine the system in which the Lords
are chosen.
Many different groups can put
forward candidates to sit in the House of
Lords. Some of these groups include the
Prime Minister, the House of Lords
Nominating Committee and individuals
political parties. Also, although frowned
upon, candidates can even nominate
themselves. Candidates are then reviewed by
the House of Lords Appointments
Commission. Established in 2000, the House
of Lords Appointments Commission is a
nonpartisan group that vets candidates for
the Lords and either accepts or denies the
request. Then the list of approved candidates
are handed over to the Crown for Royal
Assent, which the Crown provides in a
rather rubberstamp like manner. Before the
Commission was created in 2000, the Lords
were nominated only by the Prime Minister.
This gave the Commons direct control over
the composition of the Lords. Now the
process is more neutral. One more factor
that is important to note once a Lord is
nominated, approved, and created, unless
that Lord behaves improperly or commits a
crime, he is a Lord for life. This means that
even if a Lord is not voting in the way the
group that nominated them wanted to, there
is nothing that group can do. Therefore, if a
conservative Prime Minister nominated a
Lord to vote conservatively in the House,
and that Lord starts to vote with the liberals,
there is no mechanism for the Prime
Minister to remove that Lord. How this
relates to autonomy is that even though the
Commons may have some influence on
selecting the Lords, they have no way to
control them afterward. This coupled with
the lack of highly restrictive checks for the
Lords by the Commons illustrate that the
Lords are not puppets of the lower house but
are independent and free to express their
own policies in their legislation, even when

bystanders in the politics of the United
Kingdom.
Shifting focus now, whether or not
the Lords are autonomous from the
Commons, or whether they are puppets of
the lower house must be addressed. This will
do by examining the checks placed on the
Commons by the Lords. Then how the Lords
are selected, all in an effort to determine if
the Lords can claim autonomy, will be
investigated. Note that discussing the checks
the Lords have on the Commons will not be
discussed here; these checks were discussed
in the section on authority of the Lords.
The system of checks placed on the
Lords by the Commons is specifically
designed so that the democratically elected
house can overrule the appointed upper
house. If a bill is defeated by the Lords, the
Commons reserve the right to reintroduce
that bill in the following session of
Parliament. When the bill is reintroduced,
the Commons do not need the Lords to
approve the bill before it can be passed into
law. What this essentially does is to allow
the Commons to bypass the Lords on the
second go around, if the first failed.
Nonetheless, the Commons must wait up to
a year in some instances in order to take
advantage of this mechanism. This also
explains why the Commons are willing to
negotiate and compromise with the Lords as
often as they do. (See section on authority)
The impact this has on the level of
autonomy the Lords possess is that the
checks placed on the Lords are no stricter
than those placed on the Commons.
Additionally, although there is a mechanism
for the Commons to bypass the Lords this
mechanism is slow and more often than not,
the Commons chose to negotiate rather than
take advantage of it. This indicates that the
Lords are not puppets controlled by the
Lords, but are an autonomous house.
However, in order to say confidently that the
Lords are independent of the Commons, one
20
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the lower house. Nonetheless, what does all
of this mean? Our definition of political
relevance was that an institution must be
legitimate, possess independent authority,
and either is autonomous in the policies it
expresses, or has some influence on policies
put forth by the dominant house in order to
be considered politically relevant. When
looked at by this definition it has been
shown that the House of Lords are
politically relevant because it meets all the
requirements of the definition. It is
legitimate, has some power, and is
autonomous. In addition because the House
of Lords is considered by many to be the
weakest and least politically relevant of all
upper houses, one can further hypothesize
that parliamentary upper houses in general
are politically relevant. Again, this is not to
say that they are as relevant, or more
relevant, than lower houses, which are by far
more powerful and influential. What is
meant is that they are not as weak and
powerless as their reputations would lead
one to believe, they are not relics of an older
idea of governance but are still relevant in
the modern political system.

that policy contradicts those of the
Commons.
The last factor concerns political
relevance, influence on legislation. Influence
will be measured by the rate at which
legislation introduced by the Lords become
law. In the British system bills are
introduced in one House of Parliament,
approved, sent to the other House for
approval and then sent to the Crown,
monarch, for approval. This approval is
known as Royal Assent and is the last stage
of a bill before it becomes law. The chart
below shows how often bills from the Lords
have become law since 2007.
*See table 5
As can be seen from table 5 no bill
originating from the Lords has been passed
into law since 2008. Now, while this may
appear to indicate that the Lords have little
influence on policy, it must be remembered
that overall the Lords do not introduce many
bills to begin with, as already discussed,
they tend to amend bills from the Commons
to reflect their policies rather introduce their
own legislation. However, aside from that,
the fact that very few bills introduced by the
Lords eventually become law does indicate
that while they may have some influence
using delays and defeats (see section on
authority for more details) they have
nowhere near the amount of influence the
Commons possess.
What this research has shown is that
the House of Lords meets the requirements
put forward and should be considered
politically relevant. It is legitimate, and is
seen as legitimate by the public. The Lords
have some level of authority. The upper
house is autonomous of the lower house.
Additionally, although they have some
influence on legislation from the Commons
it is not sufficient to say with certainty that
the House can influence bills put forward by
21
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Table 1:
Question: Public attitudes to change in Lords legitimacy since 1999
Voters

Far More
Legitimate

More
Legitimate

No
Change

Less
Legitimate

Far Less
Legitimate

Labour

19%

32%

36%

10%

4%

Total
more
Legitimate
51%

Conservative

9%

19%

26%

20%

26%

28%

Liberal
Democrats
All voters

19%

30%

28%

11%

11%

49%

16%

27%

31%

13%

13%

43%

Source: Data taken from Russel and Scaria, 2006. Data was collected by Ipsos MORI poll for
Constitution Unit, May 2005. 1,007 valid respondents, with results adjusted to be representative
of the population as a whole.

Table 2:
Question: As you may have heard, there has recently been debate about reforming the House of
Lords. Which of these statements is closest to your view?
I support reforming the House of Lords, and the
7%
government should make it an immediate priority
I support reforming the House of Lords, but there
72%
are more important things that the government
should be concentrating on at the moment
I don’t support reforming the House of Lords
16%
Don’t know
4%
Source: Taken from Ipsos MORI interviewed a representative sample of 1,006 adults aged 18+
across Great Britain. Interviews were conducted by telephone 14-16 July 2012. Data are
weighted to match the profile of the population.
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Table 3:
Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree that …?

Strongly
agree

Tend to
agree

Neither
agree nor
disagree
%

Tend to
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Don't
know

%
%
%
%
%
the House of
Commons generally
7
39
22
15
4
12
carries out its policy
role well
the House of Lords
generally carries out
8
41
24
9
3
15
its policy role well
Source: Taken from Ipsos MORI.com. Results are based on 1,490 adults aged 18+ in the UK.
Interviewed face-to-face in home from 23-28 November 2006.

Table 4:
Question Outcome by Significance of Government Defeats in 2003
Policy significance
Minor policy

Gov’t win
27

Lords win
12

Total
39

% Lords win
30.8%

Medium-significance
Policy
Significant policy

60

45

105

42.9%

77

53

130

40.8%

Total

164

110

274

40.1%

Source: Data taken from Russell and Sciara 2008. Based out of 274 cases from the 2003 session
of Parliament.
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Table 5:
Question: How many bills originating in the House of Lords becomes Law?
Session of
Parliament

Total number of
Bills

Number of HL
Bills
23

Number of Bills
Given Royal
Assent
42

Number of HL
Bills Given
Royal Assent
6

2007-2008

161

2008-2009

164

20

35

0

2009-2010

113

25

36

0

2010-2012

390

36

54

0

Source: Data taken from parliament.uk and compiled from among 828 bills since 2007. Note that
HL designates bills originating in the House of Lords.
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